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Challenge  
The new technological paradigm associated with progress in IT (information and 
automation technologies), or digitalization, is both singular and disruptive because of its 
reach and its exponential speed. It has transformed the way we work, play, 
communicate, interact, and exchange, impacting in the economy, production and 
globalization, but also in the social, cultural, political and geopolitical spheres, at the 
world level. More changes are inevitable and the pace of change will probably 
accelerate1. 
The joint work of G20 in 2018 of three Working Groups, Employment, Education and 
Digitalization, underscores the importance of understanding the interplay of 
technological change with jobs, skills, wages and opportunity. More and better data and 
measurement are at the heart of this challenge. 
 
1. What do we know already from recent history? 
-Not yet a widespread substitution of human labor 
The evolution of labor aggregates in developed countries does not reflect a steep 
disruption in their employment-to-population ratios. Autor & Salomons (2017, 2018) 
demonstrate that even when increases in labor productivity in an industry are associated 
with a within-industry reduction in employment (direct negative effect), they also 
generate a cross-industry increase in employment (indirect positive effect). This cross-
industry increase in employment can be stimulated by a combination of income effects 
resulting from an increase of the disposable income of consumers due to lower prices, 
and forward and backward linkages, which raise production and employment in 
industries not directly affected by the particular innovation (“indirect positive effect”). 
As we can see in Figure 1, these positive effects tend to outweigh the within-industry 
fall in employment, concluding in a modestly positive net effect of productivity growth 
_________________________ 
1 National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (2017), Information Technology and the Status of the US Workforce, 
Committee on Information Technology, Automation, and the U.S. Workforce, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, 
Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, The National Academy Press, Washington D.C., www.nap.edu, Págs.1-3. 
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over employment, in line with the relative stability of labor aggregates in developed 
countries. 
 
- Sharply disrupted composition of labor with large distributive impact: employment 
polarization 
Technological change (TC) in developed countries, from the 80s and 90s, resulted in 
employment polarization (or hollowing-out) with a shrinking of middle skill jobs, white 
and blue collar, and an increase in the employment share of low and high-skill 
occupations2. Figures 2A and 2B document this employment polarization trend in recent 
decades both for a wide set of European countries and the United States. 
 
Figure 1: Predicted effects of TFP Growth on Aggregate Employment and Aggregate Hours of 
Labor Input (19 developed countries, 1970-2007)
 




2 This finding is very robustly documented by a vast set of academic works: Spitz-Oener (2006), Goos & Manning (2007), Goos, 
Manning & Salomons (2009), Mieske (2009), Autor (2010, 2015), Oesch & Menes (2011), Holmes & Mayhew (2012), Autor & 
Dorn (2013), Adermon & Gustavsson (2015). Using their initial mean wages as a proxy of the skill content of occupations, they 
observe the variation of the share in total employment during a specific period, documenting a polarization pattern with the 
corresponding fall in the share of middle-skill occupations and a relative growth of low and high-skill employment. 
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Figure 2A: Smoothed changes in employment by occupation ranked by wage percentile 
(United States, 1979-2012) 
 
Source: Levy Yeyati and Sartorio (2018) on the basis of Autor (2015) 
 
Figure 2B: Change in Occupational Employment Shares in Low, Middle and High Wage 
Occupations (16 EU Countries, 1993-2010) 
 
Source: Autor (2014) on the basis of Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014) 
 
Indeed, polarization is explained by Skilled Biased Technical Change and Task-Biased 
Technical Change, much more than by the offshoring of jobs. Following this hypothesis 
developed in Autor, Levy & Murnane (2003) and Acemoglu & Autor (2011), TC tends 
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to automate “routine tasks” that follow easily definable procedures, and which are 
frequently characteristic of middle-skilled jobs. Nevertheless, TC has difficulties to 
replace both highly qualified abstract tasks like complex problem solving, creativity, 
leadership or negotiation and non-routine less qualified manual tasks highly dependent 
on personal interaction or visual and language recognition and which are very important 
in low-skill services and difficult to automate. The Task-Biased Technical Change is the 
fundamental explanation of polarization, above others like the offshoring of middle-
skilled jobs3.  
 
- Automation and the secular downward trend in labor shares 
The decline of labor shares both in developed and developing countries during the last 
decades is a very robustly documented stylized fact4. TC and labor automation is 
strongly associated with this decline, fundamentally in developed countries but also 
playing a role in emerging markets. Even when the net impact of productivity gains is 
not necessarily negative, labor automation can lead to a labor share decline, widening 
the income gap between employees and employers. Figure 3 developed by Dao, Das, 
Koczan & Lian (2017) shows this negative contribution to the change in labor share. 
  
_________________________ 
3 See for example Autor & Dorn (2013), Autor, Dorn & Hanson (2015), Michaels, Natraj & Van Reenen (2014), Goos, Manning & 
Salomons (2014), Timmer & Ye (2014) and Akerman, Gaarder & Mofstad (2015). These studies corroborate the greater intensity in 
routine taks of middle-skill occupations and showed that technological adoption was correlated with more rutinary occupations and 
with the consequent decline in their share in total employment while, in opposition, offshorability measure have little or no 
explanatory capacity when the effect of technology and routine intensity is controlled for. OECD (2017) analyses the relationship 
between polarization and de-industrialization (employing econometric techniques), and concludes that technology displays the 
strongest association with both polarization and de-industrialization. Although the role of globalization is less clear-cut, there also 
emerges some indication that international trade has contributed to de-industrialization in advanced countries. 
4 See for example Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013), Piketty (2014), Dao, Das, Koczan & Lian (2017), Autor, Dorn, Katz, 
Patterson y Van Reenen (2017). 
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Figure 3: Contributions to Aggregate Labor Share Changes, 1993-2014  
 
Source: Dao, Das, Koczan & Lian (2017) 
 
- A growing skill mismatch and massive workers transition 
There is a growing “skill mismatch”, i.e. lack of correspondence between the demand of 
skills of new employment and the supply of skills of workers whose jobs were 
substituted by technology, and a challenge for public policy to ease massive workers 
transitions. According to a Mc Kinsey (2017), an estimate of between 75 and 375 
million workers will transition from obsolete occupations to new ones by 2030. 
 
2. Predictions related to Future of Work 
Predictions of the risk of automation show significant variance5 . Frey & Osborne 
(2013) estimated that 47% of US employment was at “high risk”, while Arntz, Gregory 
_________________________ 
5 See for example Frey & Osborne (2013), Arntz, Gregory & Zierahn (2016), World Bank (2016), 
McKinsey Global Institute (2016). However, even future of work predictions show a high degree of 
variance, the relative comparison of the studies is useful. It helps to identify areas of consensus in relative 
estimates regarding differential susceptibilities for types of occupations, gender, social and demographic 
subgroups, productive sectors, and geographies. When analyzing how policy should respond it is critical 
to understand the implications for different groups and regions, notably the most vulnerable and those 
with the highest exposure. 
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& Zierahn (2016), using the same automation indexes by task, but considering within-
occupation variability in the intensity of different tasks, concluded that only 9% of 
employment in US was at high risk. 
 Indeed, as pointed out by Levy Yeyati and Sartorio (2018) there are diverse obstacles in 
the forecast which generate biases and explain the variability in the estimates (that 
depend on indexes conditioned by both the subjectivity and knowledge of the experts 
consulted and the weighting methodology). In addition, defining with precision the 
degree of intensity in routine tasks needed to entirely replace an occupation can lead to 
radically different conclusions: while the McKinsey Global Institute (2017) estimates 
that no more than 5% of occupations are fully composed by susceptible automatable 
activities, more than 60% of occupations have at least 30% of automatable activities. 
The economic discipline has, therefore, limitations to predict with precision the timing 
and the specific magnitude of these phenomenom with a satisfactory level of 
confidence.  Note that the “potential scope of automation” is a different concept than the 
“effective estimated impact of automation”, since cost effectiveness or social and legal 
factors can delay its effective adoption.  Also, the net impact of automation will depend 
on the creation of new jobs, some of which we do not know or do not exist yet, still 
harder to estimate. 
3. Dramatic Information Failures Impair Policy Responses 
Dramatic information failures in the job market preclude understanding of the scale and 
depth of the challenge. These failures impair the capacity of governments and 
institutions to ease worker transitions, solve the skills mismatch problem and disrupt 
technological unemployment. Data and measurement are at the heart of this conundrum. 
Particularly, real time, more granular data regarding changes in occupations and skills 
demand is needed in order to make anticipated and better decisions in education, long 
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Proposal 
Notwithstanding the data and measurement gaps, recent research on the Future of Work 
has highlighted both the great challenges and opportunities confronting governments 
and institutions. In order to provide the necessary rationale to our policy proposals, and 
complementarily to the challenges analyzed in the previous section, it is useful to 
summarize main findings in the following eight points: 
1) Technological advances associated with IT (information and automation 
technologies), including machine learning, AI and robotics will continue with 
exponential reach and speed. Biggest innovations will still be introduced and new 
technological capacities will probably emerge6. 
2) IT led technical change is Skill and Task Biased. It has resulted and will further 
result in: i) the automation of routine tasks (cognitive and manual), typically middle 
skill, resulting in employment polarization in developed countries with new evidence of 
polarization as well in emerging countries7; ii) the augmentation of the capacity of 
workers to perform certain tasks, usually non-routine, where technology is a 
complement of work (not a substitute); y iii) the creation of new occupations, that we do 
not know and are difficult to predict8; iv) the object of automation is tasks not 
occupations, but the automation of routine tasks leads to the substitution of certain 
occupations and the regrouping of tasks in another occupations;  v) the probability of 
automation decreases with the level education and income of the worker. 
3) The final net impact of these technologies over employment is not predetermined. 
The ultimate effects will be the result not only of TC per se, but of how it is used, and 
how people, firms, governments, institutions and international organizations respond 
_________________________ 
6National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (2017), Ibid, Págs, 2, 8, 14, & 158. 
7 Dutz, M., Almeida R., & Packard T. (2018). “The Jobs of Tomorrow: Technology, Productivity and Prosperity in Latin America 
and the Caribbean”. World Bank Group, Washington D.C. 
8National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (2017), Ibid;  Nofal, Coremberg and Sartorio, Luca (2017); Jim Jong 
Kim (2018) “Building Human Capital”, President of the World Bank, speech made in the IMF/WB Spring Meetings, April 21, 
2018, www.live.worldbank.org 
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and prepare for these changes in the economy and society9. On the other hand, 
notwithstanding the fear of the likely impact of disruptive innovations over 
employment, some studies indicate that we cannot conclude, on the basis of evidence, 
that technology has resulted in a net reduction of the quantity of employment10 .  
4) The education system will need to constantly adapt in order to prepare the 
workforce for the changing labor market. There is a certain consensus that as IT 
continues to substitute or complement many work tasks, workers will need both digital 
skills and transferable skills that emphasize creativity, adaptability, and interpersonal 
skills over routine information processing and routine manual tasks11. At the same time, 
IT offers significant opportunities to be used to advance educational and long life 
training strategies and delivery. IT also can be used to reduce the skill mismatch 
problem by building skills, matching opportunity with talent and addressing digital 
gender divides12.  
5) IT is enabling new forms of work on-demand via apps and remote crowd-work, 
through digital platforms which are growing exponentially and show significant 
potential for employment growth, labor inclusion, and transparency. However, there are 
potential risks and challenges of the gig economy, as pointed out in by ILO (2017), 
regarding social protection, employment security, earnings, hours, occupational health 
and safety, training and representation13. Similarly, Hunt (2018), from the standpoint of 
gender parity, points out that, given the existence of digital gender divides and 
discrimination (because of gender, race, or age) specific attention by policy makers is 
_________________________ 
9 National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (2017), Ibid;  Nofal,  Coremberg and  Sartorio (2017);  
10Autor, David (2015) “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation”. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives—Volume 29, Number 3, Summer 2015,Pags. 3–30.  Also, the results of the WEF Business Survey in 2016, 
titled “The Future of Jobs”, result in an estimate of a net positive impact of technological change of 2.02% in future employment. 
11Linkedin, IDB with the collaboration of Beatriz Nofal (2018) “Presentation G20 Workshop: Building Opportunities for an 
Inclusive Future of Work” Presentation G20 Workshop of three Working Groups: Digitalization, Employment and Education. 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, April 12 2018. PDF version. A Summary is posted in  Linkedin´s Economic Graph “Sharing Labor Market 
Insights in Latin America”. 
12 The G20 #eskills4girls Initiative is an excellent example of this in practice. Also, SheWorks.com is other example of a platform 
that addresses the gender digital divide and helps women´s labor inclusion as well as the building of women´s digital skills. 
13 ILO (2017). “Inception Report for the Global Commission on the Future of Work”, December 2017  
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needed to ensure equality and non discrimination in digitally mediated work, and its link 
with the social protection system14.  
6) TC has impacted and will continue impacting global value chains (GVCs) and 
globalization. Progress in robotics technology is resulting in the re-shoring of some 
activities and the shortening of manufacturing GVCs. These trends could result in both 
future significant disruptions for emerging countries that are integrated in GVCs or limit 
the opportunities of lower income countries to climb the ladder by promoting 
manufacturing-export led development15. However, digitalization, and the increased 
services intensity of manufacturing, is enabling the participation, and maybe the 
leapfrogging, of developing countries through the export of knowledge intensive 
services. 
7) TC and digitalization have a strong distributive impact among workers and also 
among firms, with the rise of “super star firms”. All of this is opening a huge policy 
debate around the “redistribution” issue, which goes from universal income, to tax 
policy and competition policy. 
8) To better inform public policy, private sector decisions and education and lifelong 
learning strategies it is necessary a systematic, continuous and comparable 
international research effort to track new technological developments and their 
impact on employment, the workforce and the economy16. To this end are needed 
new statistical sources that should be comparable internationally, new data sources, new 
indicators and rigorous forms to measure the impact on the economy and society.  
Until we can measure the size of the future of work challenges adequately, it will be 
difficult to attract the commitment of the resources needed, as well as the breadth of the 
_________________________ 
14 Hunt, Abigail (2018).  An example of digital labor training and inclusion, in the province of Buenos Aires, Argentina, there is the 
case, implemented  in Cooperative “La Juanita” by, social leader, Toty Flores and by, Oscar awarded, movie Director Juan 
Campanella (“El Potrero Digital”) . Similarly, Arbusta, in Argentina, is a case of entrepreuneurial impact investment for digital 
skills in marginalized areas. Another example of how technology can at the same time help transparency in the execution of public 
purchases of computer based services,  labor inclusion and productivity (translating in fiscal savings),  is the platform 
TransparentBusiness.com 
15 Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar Gaurav (2017) Trouble in the Making? The Future of Manufacturing-Led Development, World 
Bank Group, Washington D.C. 
16 National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (2017) 
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multistakeholder engagement required to address them. Because of this and because of 
the difficulties to predict associated with the inherent uncertainty of technological 
change, the Future of Work is often considered as a “soft” issue.  
Better data and better measurement will allow for better judgment and better policies 
necessary to ease workers transitions, to invest in people and to facilitate the digital 
transformation of SMEs globally so as to make digitalization work for all, increase 
productivity, and prevent new social divides. The G20 is the key international forum for 
the launching of these initiatives. 
In conclusion, to effectively adress these Future of Work challenges and embrace the 
opportunities of digitalization, the G20 should both strenghthen the international 
research agenda in, at least, the three main pillars indicated below and, at the same time, 
implement global multistakeholder initiatives to bridge the digital skills gap. 
i) Proposal 1: Track technological developments globally 
Identification and tracking of technological developments by Governments and 
International Organizations in a multidisciplinary, collaborative, integrated and 
comparative world research program. Duplication of efforts among IOs should be 
avoided. More coordination and cooperation is needed. Also, research findings should 
be treated as a global public good and made open so as to facilitate different actors in 
society, public and private sectors, to conform the future of work for the benefit of all, 
for more inclusive growth. G20 Leaders can instruct IOs to continue and align their 
ongoing research effors to these objectives 
ii) Proposal II: Develop new methods of measurement for the digital 
economy 
Development of new methods of measurement should be pursued so that the digital 
economy and innovation are integrally measured and reflected in macroeconomic 
statistics, and are consistent with the measurement methodology of GDP and National 
Accounts SCN08 from United Nations. The National Accounts System we are using 
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must adapt to measure the economy of the XXI century17, not just the XX century 
economy.  
It is necessary to have an integrated and expanded approach to measure and analyse the 
impact of digital innovations on the economy.  We have proposed as a methodology to 
use an Innovation Satellite Account (Coremberg, Nofal 2017) in order to integrate the 
impact of digital economy from the point of view of GDP accounts, growth accounting 
and welfare (See Box 1 and 2 below). This methodological approach follows the main 
proposals of Stiglitz, Sen Fittoussi (2009) to expand traditional accounts in order to 
measure welfare, growth and enviromental sustainability.  
Also, it is necessary to advance on an internationally agreed definition of digital trade 
and a form of measurement it. One of the difficulties to measure digital trade is that 
digitalization per se erodes the cross border frontier that traditionally defined the 
measurement of physically traded goods and services. The G20 Trade and Investment 
Working Group 2017 started to work on this issue of digital trade but no final 
conclusion was reached. Continuity of this work in G20 TWIG is strongly 
recommended in 2018 and beyond, as well as an instruction of G20 Leaders to update 




17 Stiglitz J., Sen A. and Fitoussi J.P. (2009) “Report by the Commission on the Economic Performance and Social Progress”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/118025/118123/Fitoussi+Commission+report, and www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr. This report 
highlights that several economic phenomena that impact on wellbeing are not included in GDP. The measurement of new digital 
activities is under debate and also their impact on wellbeing and productivity, mainly because traditional methods on how to 
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Box 1 - Innovation Satellite Account 
The SNA approach allows theories and methodologies to be adapted to a phenomenon such as 
innovation, which needs to be defined and measured in a way that encompasses products and 
activities that are not necessarily compatible with traditional GDP classifications. This issue 
takes the form of so-called satellite accounts (SAs). To measure the potential impact of 
innovation on a country’s economy, researchers tend to simulate what are known as “indirect 
and induced effects” through production linkages. 
The standard classifications of products and industries (CPC and ISIC) arrange all industries 
and products at the same hierarchy level. The SNA is flexible enough to regroup them so that a 
key sector can be analyzed. By so doing, the standard supply and use tables can be estimated for 
the sector that one wishes to measure by expanding on details that do not appear in the standard 
presentation. This analysis is contained in the NAs: activities and products need to be regrouped 
based on a query or focus that usually touches on several activities or aspects of them. 
The best-known international examples are the NAs for tourism and health. These experiences 
have focused on the supply side by including production activities that are associated with, 
connected to, and generated by the main activity. However, they do not fully calculate the 
demand side, for which they would need to include not just foreign trade flows but also 
consumption and investment. 
Few NAs have been developed for knowledge, although significant work has been carried out 
by official NA bodies such as the CBS in the Netherlands and the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) in the United States. In line with the 2008 SNA recommendations, the BEA has counted 
R&D and expenditures on intangible intellectual property assets as investments since 2013. 
These include the creation of entertainment, literary, or artistic originals and other intangible 
assets that have already been capitalized, such as software, adjusting estimates of GDP, savings, 
investment, and foreign direct investment. The OECD has also created work groups to measure 
the so-called knowledge-based capital (KBC), but it does so partially, only taking intangible 
assets and the capital of employees in certain jobs into account. 
An exhaustive estimate of the knowledge NA would allow researchers to identify and quantify 
knowledge-generating production activities, but it would not quantify the impact of knowledge 
on productivity, employment, and trade in production activities that demand, acquire, and adapt 
innovation and knowledge but do not necessarily generate it. Similarly, although the 2008 NSA 
and the BEA have capitalized R&D and the creation of intellectual property assets, they 
continue to omit a series of intangible assets that have a major impact on firms’ productivity, 
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Box 2 - Knowledge Capital 
Authors such as Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011) point out that for innovation to generate 
increased productivity and profitability in firms needs to be accompanied by a reorganization of 
the production process and investment in intangible assets and human capital. The most 
productive firms reorganize their production processes, incentive systems, information flows, 
and other aspects of organizational capital to take maximum advantage of technology. This, in 
turn, requires a more skilled workforce. According to these authors, each dollar invested in 
hardware requires another ten to be invested in complementary organizational capital. For the 
organization to be successful, high levels of investment in intangible assets are needed, which 
organizational capital is part of. Intangible assets are generally much harder to generate and 
change, but they are also more important to the organization’s success. 
The 2008 SNA and the Measuring Capital OECD Manual (2009) include traditional capital 
assets within the asset boundary: tangible capital goods (machinery, constructions, livestock for 
breeding, etc.) and some intangible assets (software, goodwill, patents, etc.) and natural 
resources (subsoil assets, agricultural land) that are subject to property rights. Changes to the 
latest version of the SNA include the recommendation to explicitly measure capital services in 
line with recent advances in measuring productivity and the sources of growth: World KLEMS 
is the standard initiative used to measure and compare productivity internationally (and 
ARKLEMS+LAND is the Argentine version of this). 
As Mas and Quesada (2015) mention, for investment in ICTs and R&D to have a positive effect 
on firms’ productivity, profitability, and market value, a series of complementary investments 
need to be made to facilitate the efficient adaptation of the remaining components of the 
production system: education and worker training, brand creation and building, customer 
loyalty, and other expenses outlaid within the company or subcontracted on the market. 
Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2005) define investment as “any use of resources that reduces 
current consumption in order to increase it in the future”. Therefore, it follows that investment 
in both the generation and use of knowledge needs to be included alongside investment in 
infrastructure, machinery, and equipment, as we proposed in Coremberg and Nofal (2017): not 
only ICT but also intangible investment as expenditure on design and systems, advertising, 
market research, expenditure on redesign of organizational structure, and training of human 
capital18. 
In this way, a series of outlays on intangible assets are included within the asset boundary for 
knowledge capital (see Table A). 
_________________________ 
18 The inclusion of private-sector expenditure on intangible assets in the investment category 
has significant effects on both the aggregate value of the economy and macroeconomic 
investment. Mas and Quesada (2015) found that the inclusion of intangible assets increases 
developed countries’ GDP by approximately 10%, doubles investment levels in the United 
States, and represents almost 50% of traditional net capital formation in the European Union. 
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TABLE A: KNOWLEDGE CAPITAL 
TANGIBLE 
ASSETS 








MINERAL AND PETROLEUM 
EXPLORATION 
SCIENTIFIC R&D 
ARTISTIC AND ENTERTAINMENT 
ORIGINALS 
NEW PRODUCTS/SYSTEMS IN FINANCIAL 
SERVICES 









HIRED HUMAN CAPITAL 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Source: Coremberg and Nofal (2017), Corrado et al. (2005), Mas and Quesada (2015). 
Note that this definition expands the asset boundary beyond that used in the 2008 SNA: several 
factors that the SNA handles as running costs that form part of intermediate consumption are 
capitalized as production factors here, namely expenditure on design and systems, advertising, 
market research, expenditure on redesign of organizational structure, and training human 
capital. 
Likewise, building on these proposals from Corrado et al. (2005) and Mas and Quesada (2015), 
we have included human capital stock in knowledge capital in the form of firms’ investment in 
staff training and hired human capital, as firms demand and use skilled labor trained by other 
firms; through expenditure on staff training; the experience that workers have accumulated 
previously in the labor market; and the training they accrue through the education system. 
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What we are proposing here is for knowledge capital to include expenditure on both the tangible 
and intangible assets used to generate knowledge and innovation, along with assets that 
incorporate accumulated knowledge into production according to the classification set out in 
Table B. 
























IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 















UNSKILLED LABOR (PRIMARY EDUCATION OR LESS) 
Source: Compiled by the authors. 
Economics Discussion Paper (2018–71)—submitted to Global Solutions Papers 
 17 
Real-estate assets and unskilled labor are excluded, as they do not include or generate new 
knowledge. Consequently, we describe them here as “nonreproductive capital” in a way that is 
analogous to the exclusion of housing as capital, in that nonrental housing is not associated with 
production activity carried out by certain economic agents. 
In this way, by including assets that generate knowledge and the organizational capital needed 
for knowledge to be used effectively within the production process, we are not only expanding 
the accounting method for a given country’s wealth but also identifying the production services 




iii) Proposal III:  Harmonize the Occupational Taxonomy  and Develop 
New Sources of Data and Indicators at the International Level 
Development of new, more timely and granular sources of data and indicators, 
regarding occupations and workforce, that should be harmonized and comparable 
internationally, is required to better monitor, measure and anticipate the impact of 
technological change on the labor market. This will allow governments and institutions 
to make better informed  decisions regarding education, training and and lifelong 
learning, as well as regarding active labor market and employment policies and 
workforce development.  
On the one hand, for international comparable research work on the impact of 
technological change on the labor market we need to have at the international level an 
harmonized occupational taxonomy and data base like the US O*NET or ESCO from 
Europe with detailed, standardized and quantifiable descriptions of tasks involved and 
skills required in different occupations. The international replication and harmonization 
of an occupational taxonomy and code system like O*NET or ESCO is necessary to 
analyze the impact of these phenomena globally as well as to be able to develop more 
rigorous indicators, for instance, that can measure the risk of automation of certain 
tasks, and also to analyze, on comparable basis, the impact of offshoring and 
international trade on the labor market. To the extent possible, policymakers should also 
encourage employers to use the harmonized taxonomy when describing the jobs 
opening and the tasks, skills and experiences required. 
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In 1988 the world agreed and introduced an Harmonized System of Commodity 
Descriptions (HS), of 5300 articles and product descriptions (in a six-digit code system), 
to classify traded goods on a common basis for trade and customs purposes. G20 leaders 
can now entrust competent IOs to engage in a similar and highly needed effort to 
harmonize an occupational taxonomy and codes so as to fill the statistical and data gaps 
and formulate evidence based policy responses for an inclusive digitalization and the 
future of work.  
On the other hand, it is important to access to new real- time and more granular sources 
of data so as to develop new indicators related to changes in occupations and new 
employment creation and to the resulting changes in skill demand. For that purpose, the 
main sources of information is not statistical, survey or administrative but private data, 
mainly part of “big data” generated in digital platforms and professional social 
networks (like the case of Linkedin19 and others, e.g. Google for Jobs). Therefore, it is 
necessary to explore possible collaboration or partnership arrangements among 
governments, international organizations and digital firms to obtain access to real time 
and more granular research data, respecting fully privacy and data protection criteria. In 
this regard, it is auspicious that already there have been initiatives of this sort of 
strategic partnership already implemented to share this valuable information. It is 
important to coordinate at the international level these collaborative public-private 
research initiatives, until now implemented in the form of individual cases20, in order to 
access new sources of data and to develop new indicators for real time monitoring of 
key employment, skill and economic trends. The G20 is a multilateral forum crucially 
relevant to launch and give impulse to this multistakeholder initiative.  
 
_________________________ 
19 See Linkedin and IDB G20 Workshop Presentation together with Beatriz Nofal (2018) as a sample of the potential. LinkedIn, the 
professional network, has more than 550 million members, 20 million companies, and 14 million jobs on its platform.  The activity 
of this network, analyzed in LinkedIn´s“Economic Graph,” cumulatively generates billions of data points every day which are 
relevant to understanding and reacting to employment, skills and workforce trends.  
20 For instance, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank have agreed individually with Linkedin to work 
together to widen the understanding of present and future of work challenges.  
Economics Discussion Paper (2018–71)—submitted to Global Solutions Papers 
 19 
iv) Proposal IV: Build International Collaborative Platforms for Digital 
Skills and the Digital Transformation of SMES 
In a complementary fashion, G20 Leaders could envisage developing a multistakeholder 
initiative with the technology companies, at the international level, in the form of a 
collaborative platform21 to educate and train people in digital skills and, also, to propel 
the digital transformation of SMEs22. The strengthening of the digital capabilities and 
business models of SMEs would probably facilitate their contribution to meet the 
pressing and daunting employment challenges at present23 and in the years to come.  
The Future of Work is now. It is not predetermined: let´s act on it! 
  
_________________________ 
21 As example of collaborative digital transformational platforms implemented  by advanced countries Germany developed 
“Plattform Industrie 4.0”, France “Industrie de Futur” and Spain “Industria Conectada 4.0” 
22 SME´s represent, on average, 95% of the companies in almost every country of the world (WTO 2016), concentrate about 60% 
of jobs in developed countries and 80% in developing countries (World Bank 2013) and are estimated to account for 60 to 70% of 
global GDP (UN SDGS 2015-2030). 
23 Hunt (2018) highlights that “Gelb and Khan (2016) have shown that the number of people seeking jobs may be ten times the 
number recorded as officially unemployed by most statistical systems – 2 billion people globally are classified as ‘outside the labour 
force’, meaning they are neither working nor looking for work. Critically, very little is known about this group – what is clear, 
however, is that about two thirds (68%) of them are women (ibid.), and the 2013 World Development Report (WDR) on jobs 
confirms that ‘an unknown number’ are ‘eager to have a job’ (World Bank, 2013, cited in Gelb and Khan, 2016)”. 
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You are most sincerely encouraged to participate in the open assessment of this 
discussion paper. You can do so by either recommending the paper or by posting your 
comments. 
 
Please go to: 
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2018-71         
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